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Antiviral treatment offers a fast acting alternative to vaccination; as such it is
viewed as a first-line of defence against pandemic influenza in protecting
families and households once infection has been detected. In clinical trials,
antiviral treatments have been shown to be efficacious in preventing infection,
limiting disease and reducing transmission, yet their impact at containing the
2009 influenza A(H1N1)pdm outbreak was limited. To understand this seem-
ing discrepancy, we develop a general and computationally efficient model
for studying household-based interventions. This allows us to account for
uncertainty in quantities relevant to the 2009 pandemic in a principled way,
accounting for the heterogeneity and variability in each epidemiological pro-
cess modelled. We find that the population-level effects of delayed antiviral
treatment and prophylaxis mean that their limited overall impact is quantitat-
ively consistent (at current levels of precision) with their reported clinical
efficacy under ideal conditions. Hence, effective control of pandemic influenza
with antivirals is critically dependent on early detection and delivery ideally
within 24 h.1. Introduction
Despite its relative mildness, the 2009 influenza pandemic was still a significant
cause of mortality and morbidity. The potential for future severe pandemics
continues to present a major threat [1]. Faced with a virulent strain of pandemic
influenza, one of the main public-health objectives is to control or contain the
outbreak for sufficiently long that a vaccine can be developed. Treatment
with antivirals offers the potential to enable such control. The fundamental
policy is to give antiviral treatment to all household members (or other close
contacts) as soon as an infection is identified within the household [2–4].
This has several aims: it lowers the risk of onward transmission from both
those currently infected and from subsequent household cases, and it decreases
the severity and duration of disease (both for those already infected and for
subsequent household cases).
Clinical trials of the two major antiviral treatments against influenza,
oseltamivir and zanamivir, have shown subtly different effects. Both treat-
ments appear to have similar effects in lowering susceptibility to infection,
but oseltamivir appears to be more effective in reducing transmission from
treated infected individuals [5,6]. However, a fundamental challenge is to link
these individual-level observations to population-level predictions about the
effectiveness of this type of treatment. This is precisely the type of complex pro-
blem where multiple scales and nonlinear behaviour mean that mathematical
models are essential tools.
While detailed, large-scale simulation models of entire populations are now
feasible [7], the computational requirements of such models precludes the
number of replications necessary to perform wide-ranging sensitivity analysis.





2can be efficiently used, they do not admit sufficient complex-
ity to capture the localized correlation between detection of
disease and treatment with antivirals. Household models
offer a compromise, in which great computational efficiency
can be achieved, and yet the household-level distribution of
antiviral treatment (both reactively and prophylactically)
can be robustly modelled. Deterministic and stochastic
household models have been considered in the literature
[8,9]; herein we focus on (discrete-state) stochastic models,
as most appropriate for the very early stages of an epidemic.
Household models are an increasingly popular frame-
work for studying disease dynamics [9–11]. These models
capture the epidemiological observation that a small
number of household contacts are responsible for a signifi-
cant amount of transmission, and that such contacts are
highly clustered forming a clique. Such models are also the
simplest available that contain the necessary population
heterogeneity required to accurately model antiviral prophy-
laxis, robustly capturing the fact that antivirals are generally
administered to entire households. The small number of indi-
viduals within a household additionally means that the
chance nature of transmission (and recovery) is likely to be
influential, and therefore models must allow for the stochastic
aspects of epidemic processes. One further advantage of this
approach is that parametrization through likelihood calcu-
lation becomes feasible [9,10,12,13]; although it is possible
using Monte Carlo simulations, in practice this is likely to
be too slow.
Here, we introduce a general modelling framework for
infectious disease dynamics in a population of households,
allowing for complex control interventions, focusing specifi-
cally on the impact of household antiviral treatment. Given
the computational efficiency of this methodology, we are
able to fully explore the ranges of uncertainty in the effects
of treatments, and pay considerable attention to the impact
of delays between detection and deployment of the treat-
ments. Two specific scenarios concerning this delay are
considered: in the most general form, we allow for random
detection delay (for each infected member of the household)
to the notification of authorities of possible infection, and
then subsequent random deployment delay until interven-
tion is begun; we also consider the specific case of a fixed
delay to intervention following the first infectious case
within the household.
Two simple measures are used to capture the population-
level transmission effects of any treatment regime: the
household basic reproduction number, R*, which measures
the average number of secondary households infected by
a household when the clear majority of households are
fully susceptible [9] and the doubling time early in the
pandemic, Td. To calculate these, we extend the computation-
ally efficient methods recently presented for evaluating these
characteristics in a model with a homogeneous distribution
of household sizes [10] to the higher dimensional case of a
heterogeneous distribution of household sizes based upon
census data. We use census data from Indonesia (2003), the
UK (2001) and Sudan (1990), providing a contrast between
populations dominated by single and two-person households
to ones where households of size four and larger are most
common. Throughout this paper, our default assumptions
and parameters used are based on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic,
although we believe our results should translate to other
influenza outbreaks.In common with many methods of control and other
studies [2–4,14–19], we discover that prompt action is as
important as effective action; that is to contain a pandemic,
even a highly efficacious antiviral treatment must be adminis-
tered rapidly. Nevertheless, delayed household antiviral
treatment can still significantly increase the doubling time
of the epidemic, buying time for other control measures.
1.1. Relation to previous work
Before 2009, many modelling papers were published that
dealt with mitigation of pandemic influenza, mainly motiva-
ted by concerns about H5N1 strains emerging from southeast
Asia [3,4,15–19]. This work was typically based on computa-
tionally intensive Monte Carlo simulation using estimates
of parameters from diverse sources, together with traditional
sensitivity analysis—although due to the complexity of the
models only a few realizations were generally possible. In
these models, a number of control measures were simul-
taneously simulated with the aim of containing an outbreak of
a highly virulant strain as rapidly as possible. As such, these
provided important general guidance to public-health policy
planning, which by necessity involves multiple interventions.
The motivation for our current work is different—we wish
to make a careful quantitative assessment of one particular
intervention (antivirals) to address the seeming discrepancy
between the efficacy of this intervention in clinical trials and
its lack of major impact at the population level during the
2009 pandemic. We therefore focus on a simpler households
model, as has been considered in more theoretical modelling
work [20–22], with two levels of mixing only—within and
between households. This analysis can be performed with
extreme computational efficiency; in fact, we circumvent the
need for simulation of model outputs (given parameter
values), instead evaluating our epidemiological quantities to
a desired numerical precision.
This computational efficiency allows us to achieve the
methodological ideal of fully accounting for uncertainty in
parameter values. We use posterior distributions for all par-
ameters, estimated from antiviral meta-analysis [6] and
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 transmission data [23,24] and
report full kernel density estimates, along with credible inter-
vals, for all our results. Although we focus on relatively
simple models, much more epidemiological detail could
easily be included within the general framework (for
example, asymptomatic individuals). In this work, we have
only included aspects which can be robustly parametrized.
As such our results provide novel quantitative insights into
the impact of antivirals on the 2009 pandemic and add to
the ongoing debate concerning antiviral efficacy [25].2. Models
In the basic household modelling framework, there exist two
levels of transmission: strong transmission between members
of the household, and weaker transmission between individ-
uals from different households. Typically households have a
small number of individuals so the internal dynamics must
be modelled stochastically. In this study, we are primarily
concerned with modelling pandemic influenza, so we use
an SEEIIR (susceptible–exposed–infected–recovered with two
exposed and two infectious classes) model for the infection
dynamics; this model has been used in a number of previous
Table 1. The transitions and associated rates deﬁning the stochastic SEEIIR model for the within-household dynamics; k is the size of the household. Only the
states that change in a given transition are shown, all others remain constant. The parameters t and r control the reduction in transmission and susceptibility
when antivirals are administered to all members the household, hence t ¼ r ¼ 0 for the uncontrolled epidemic.
event transition rate
internal infection (S, E1)! (S 2 1, E1 þ 1) bk(1 2 t)(1 2 r)S(I1 þ I2)/(k 2 1)
latent progression (E1, E2)! (E1 2 1, E2 þ 1) 2sE1
start shedding (E2, I1)! (E2 2 1, I1 þ 1) 2sE2
infection progression (I1, I2)! (I1 2 1, I2 þ 1) 2gI1
recovery I2! I2 2 1 2gI2
S E1 2sE1
b(1 – r) (1 – t)
a(1 – t) (I1 + I2)







Figure 1. The basic household model used in this paper. There are three levels to this model: (a) the individual level, (b) the within-household level where there is





3pandemic influenza studies [26,27]. The two stages in both
the latent and infectious periods mean that these periods
have an Erlang-2 distribution [10,28], which matches the
observed transmission profile [29].
Within the household, infectious individuals can infect sus-
ceptible individuals via transmission that is assumed to be
frequency dependent [30] in our investigations of the model
reported in §3, while in our main investigation of pandemic
influenza as reported in §4, we use an estimate of the trans-
mission parameter for each household size. The transmission
parameter is denoted bk in a household of size k. Newly
infected individuals then pass through two latent and two
infectious classes before recovering—the rates of progression
through these classes, s and g, are independent of the house-
hold size and composition. The basic events that define the
within-household model are detailed in table 1.
To maintain infection within the population, it is required
that infection can spread between households. In particular, it
is assumed that a susceptible individual contracting infection
from outside their household occurs at a rate equal to a times
the total prevalence of infection in the population. The basic
structure of the model is illustrated in figure 1. To gain
analytical traction on this model, we make the simplifying
assumption that new infections outside a given household
result in a naive household being infected, and hence that
households are only ever infected once. Given that we are
concerned with the early growth rate of an outbreak, this isa reasonable assumption which is asymptotically exact in
the limit of an infinite population of randomly mixing house-
holds early in the epidemic. We compare this theoretical
argument against Monte Carlo simulations for a range of
population sizes in the electronic supplementary material.
For this study,we concentrate on quantities that capture the
early epidemic behaviour: the household basic reproduction
number, R*, and the doubling time early in the pandemic, Td.
The household basic reproduction number, R*, is the equival-
ent of the more familiar epidemiological measure of R0 [31],
but captures the expected number of secondary households
infected in the early stages of an epidemic [9,10]. It should be
stressed that R* is a population-level threshold [9].
We first demonstrate how these values can be calculated
for a heterogeneous distribution of households, assuming
no interventions, in terms of the expectation of a path integral
of a Markov chain. This generalizes the computationally effi-
cient methodology first introduced in [10]. Later, we consider
how these quantities are modified when antiviral interven-
tions are also included. We provide MATLAB code to
implement this methodology via the EpiStruct project [32].
2.1. Early dynamics for heterogeneous distribution of
household sizes
In the study of Ross et al. [10], efficientmethodswere presented





4infection in a population of interacting households. Here we
extend this methodology to the realistic scenario in which we
have a heterogeneous distribution of household sizes hk,
where hk is the proportion of households of size k.





This is the probability that a randomly selected individual
from the population belongs to a household of size k.
The household basic reproduction number, R*, is defined
as the expected number of secondary households infected
by a single household with initially one infected member,
when the population is completely susceptible. If Xk(t) is
the continuous-time Markov chain describing the infection
dynamics for a household of size k, then we define the func-
tion I(Xk(t)) as giving the number of infectious individuals in
the household at time t. The household reproduction number










where the expectation of the integral in (2.2) may be evalu-
ated by solving a system of linear equations for each
household size k, as detailed in the study of Ross et al. [10].
The initial condition for the Markov chain, Xk(0), is taken to
be a single exposed individual in the first class E1, with all
other individuals susceptible.
The early growth rate, r, which is the rate of exponential
growth matching the expected early growth of the dynamic









where the expectation of the integral, here with exponential
discounting at rate r, may again be evaluated by solving a
system of linear equations for each household size k [10].
This integral is then combined with a numerical root-finding
method to determine r; here we have adopted MATLAB’s fzero
routine throughout. The doubling time of the early epidemic,
Td, is simply the time for the number of cases to double
(a quantity that can often be robustly estimated from epi-
demic data as it is unaffected by constant additive or
multiplicative errors) and is related to the early growth rate,
r, by Td ¼ ln(2)/r.
2.2. Modelling antiviral interventions
In §2.1, we discussed how to calculate the household basic
reproduction number, R*, and the early doubling time, Td,
for a heterogeneous distribution of households in the absence
of intervention. We now discuss the necessary modifications
to the basic model in order to account for pharmaceutical
interventions. The main challenge is modelling the delay
between the introduction of the disease to a household and
the allocation of antivirals to the household.
We assume the intervention, once it takes place, has
two main outcomes. Firstly, it reduces the susceptibility of
all individuals within the household to a fraction (1 2 r) of
their original susceptibility, where 0  r  1. Secondly, the
intervention reduces the within- and between-household
transmission rates to a fraction (1 2 t) of their originalvalues, where 0  t  1. A range of other assumptions are
possible within our model framework (such as an increased
recovery rate) but for influenza, our modelling assumptions
(motivated by current knowledge [5,6]) are that the two effects
represented by t and r are sufficient to capture the important
features of the system. The events and rates which define the
model are summarized in table 1; pre-allocation t ¼ 0 and
r ¼ 0, and post-allocation t. 0 and r. 0.
We consider three schemes to model the delay between
the initial infection and the effects of intervention: a constant
delay following the first infectious case within the household;
an exponentially distributed delay; and finally, a delay to
notification of possible infection presence within a household,
followed by an exponentially distributed delay to inter-
vention. The constant and exponentially distributed delays
represent two relatively extreme cases. The scheme with
notification involves each infectious individual within the
household independently notifying authorities of their poss-
ible infectious status at some rate rn, and once notified, there
exists an exponentially distributed delay to delivery and the
effects of intervention as in the previous case. Throughout
we focus on the average time from first symptoms to when
the antivirals take effect, and term this the mean delay.
For these schemes, the household basic reproduction
number R* and early doubling time Td can be calculated as
in §2.1 using the extended Markov chains. For the case of con-
stant delay, the expression for the expectations can be split
into two parts, with different dynamics before and after the
antivirals. Full mathematical details of all three schemes
and the various calculations involved are given in the elec-
tronic supplementary material.
One of the central claims of this paper is the efficiency
with which we can compute results. This can be seen by com-
paring times for computation of the path integrals with that
of stochastic simulations. For example, on a 2.5 GHz Intel
Core i5 machine running MATLAB, the average time to evalu-
ate equation (2.2) is 6.4  1023 s (this assumes the
exponential model with k ¼ 1, . . . , 7). In contrast, 104 replica-
tions of a Gillespie simulation of the same model takes 18 s.
This represents a speed up of three orders of magnitude,
thus large comprehensive sweeps of parameter space, such
as those shown in this paper, are computationally infeasible
using a naive Monte Carlo method.3. Results
3.1. General behaviour of antivirals
To illustrate the dynamics, we compare the three intervention
schemes for a homogeneous population of households of size
k ¼ 3. Figure 2 shows how R* and Td vary with the mean
delay to intervention. Part A shows how R* varies assuming
constant (dashed lines) and exponentially distributed delays
(solid lines) for three values of exposed period parameter s.
Part B shows the model results incorporating notification
for a single value of s, with the black lines representing the
two extreme cases of a constant delay (dashed line) and
exponentially distributed (solid line) delay. To maintain a
consistent definition of mean delay, we add on the mean
delay due to notification, which is why the coloured curves
start at non-zero values for the mean delay; these initial
values represent the minimum possible delay for a given






































Figure 2. General behaviour of antivirals. Household basic reproduction number, R*, and doubling time early in the pandemic, Td, as a function of the mean delay
to antiviral allocation for the SEEIIR model. The mean delay is taken as the time from the first infectious case to when antivirals take effect. This is composed of
notification and further allocation delay. (a,c) SEEIIR with constant and exponential delay. (b,d) SEEIIR with notification (s ¼ 1). Dashed and solid lines are from the
constant and exponential delay models, respectively, for three values of s, where 1/s is the average exposed period. (b) The coloured lines show the model results
with notification for s ¼ 1. Black dashed and solid lines are constant and exponential delay models, respectively. The coloured curves end at minimum delay
possible for a given value of the notification rate, rn. (c,d ) The doubling time, using the same colour scheme. Other parameters: k ¼ 3, bk ¼ 2, a ¼ 1,
g ¼ 1, t ¼ 0.8 and r ¼ 0.8. All rates are given in terms of days– 1. (a,c) Blue lines, s ¼ 50; green lines, s ¼ 1; red lines, s ¼ 0.5. (b,d ) Blue lines,





5instantaneous notification, the notification curve tends to that
of the exponential distribution without notification, as
expected. The limit rn! 0 corresponds to households never
notifying the authorities, and hence antivirals have no effect.
Figure 2c,d shows the corresponding early doubling time,
Td, for the same set of models. We can see that the long
exposed periods (smaller s) have a large effect on the mini-
mum doubling time Td, but not the basic reproduction
number R*, irrespective of the mean delay. In all cases, the
notification curves lie broadly within the limits of the con-
stant and exponential delay cases hence we consider only
these two extremes from now on.3.2. Impact of demographics
Figure 3a–c shows the household size distributions for the UK
(2001), Indonesia (2003) and Sudan (1990). These were chosen
to represent a range of distributions. Many western household
size distributions, for example, those of USA and Australia, are
very close to the UK data presented. To investigate the behav-
iour of the models incorporating distributions, we calculate the
reduction in transmission, t, needed to bring R* ¼ 1 as a func-
tion of the mean delay. Figure 3d shows this using the three
different household size distributions and focusing on justconstant and exponential delays. We see that the bias towards
larger household sizes in both Indonesia and Sudan means
that the maximum possible delay is smaller for a given
value of t, although the shift is not large.4. Pandemic influenza model
4.1. Parametrization
We now consider the application of our methods to assess the
use of antivirals to mitigate an outbreak of influenza, with
appropriately estimated parameters and distributions. We
focus in particular on the 2009 H1N1pdm outbreak. We esti-
mate the parameters of our model in two stages. Firstly, we
take a sample of 10 000 estimates for the transmission rate
parameters from the posterior distribution of parameters esti-
mated in [24]. This paper reports on the use of Bayesian
statistical methods to estimate transmission probabilities stra-
tified by household size, including probabilities describing
case ascertainment, using data collected from 424 households
in Birmingham, UK, during the first seven weeks of the 2009
H1N1 pandemic. As elsewhere in this paper, by using these
estimates we are assuming that the observed pandemic was
very close to what would happen in the absence of antivirals.
















































Figure 3. The reduction in transmission needed to reduce the household reproductive ratio, R* , 1, for different household size distributions. (a– c) Three house-
hold size distributions for (a) UK 2001, (b) Indonesia 2003 and (c) Sudan 1990. The values of R* for an uncontrolled epidemic are 2.3, 3.4 and 4.7 for the
distributions (a– c), respectively. (d ) The minimum value of the antiviral efficacy, t, and the maximum mean delay to reduce R* ¼ 1 for the three distributions
(a– c). The dashed lines are for the model assuming constant delay and solid lines are for the exponential delay (green, UK; blue, Indonesia; red, Sudan). Other
































































































Figure 4. Pandemic influenza parameter estimates. (a(i–vii)) Kernel density plots for the within-household transmission rate, bk, from 10 000 random samples
from the posterior distributions given in [24]; (c) 2000 (randomly selected from the 10 000) random samples for the posterior distribution for the infectious and
latent period parameters, g and s, estimated by fitting to the serial interval data (b); points are coloured according to their likelihood value as per the scale on the





6To estimate the latent and infectious periods for H1N1,
we use data from the study of Donnelly et al. [23], which col-
lates clinical serial interval data from seven epidemiological
studies in the USA early in 2009. The clinical serial interval
is the time between date of symptom onset in the index
case and the date of symptom onset in one of its secondary
cases. By computing the (theoretical) distribution of serial
intervals for the SEEIIR model, we can then use these data
and Bayesian MCMC methods to estimate a posterior distri-
bution for s and g. Details of the calculation of the serial
interval distribution for this model, and the Bayesian meth-
odology, are given in the electronic supplementary material.
Figure 4c shows 2000 random samples from the posterior
distribution estimated by fitting to the serial interval dataprovided in the study of Donnelly et al. [23] (also presented
in figure 4b) using our methodology. The distributions for
parameters t and r are shown in figure 4d,e. These are beta
density functions parametrized to match the mean and 95%
confidence intervals from the antiviral studies reviewed in
Halloran et al. [6]. The estimated reduction in transmission
was significantly different for the two drugs zanamivir
and oseltamivir, hence we provide two distributions for
these. The reduction in susceptibility was approximately the
same for both drugs. Finally, the between-household trans-
mission rate was set as a ¼ 1.18; this was chosen to give a
doubling time of approximately 7 days in the absence of




























Figure 5. Pandemic model results for the exponentially delayed model. (a,b) Kernel density plots for the household reproductive ratio, R*, as a function of the mean
delay to allocation for the two types of antivirals oseltamivir and zanamivir. Solid and dashed white curves in (a) and (b) mark the mean and the 95% credible
intervals of these distributions, respectively. (c,d ) The doubling time, Td, as a function of the mean delay for oseltamivir and zanamivir, respectively. Black lines show






We take 10 000 random samples of the parameters from the
posterior and estimated distributions, each of which, via
our methodology, provides a sample from the distribution
of the household basic reproduction number, R*, and dou-
bling time early in the epidemic, Td. We used MATLAB’s
ksdensity routine to produce kernel posterior predictive den-
sities of R* and Td. This estimates a smooth probability
density function from a finite sample of a random variable.
Figure 5a,b shows how the densities for R* change with
mean delay for the drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir assum-
ing exponentially distributed delays. Figure 5c,d shows the
corresponding change in Td. Figure 6 shows the same plots,
but assuming a constant delay. In the short delay limit (less
than 2 days), these tend to the same results as for the expo-
nential delay model. Figure 7a shows the percentage
reduction in R* for different combinations of antiviral efficacy
and mean delay. This allows the exploration of the trade-off
between reducing the mean delay and increasing antiviral
efficacy. For example, a mean delay of 2 days with an efficacy
of 0.5 would give the same percentage reduction in R* as a
delay of 4.5 days and efficacy of 0.8. In the absence of more
detailed data, we have fixed t ¼ r, but the trade-off for any
range of parameters (and models) could be evaluated in this
way. Figure 7b shows the posterior distribution for R* with
and without interventions using such a delay distribution,
taken from Ghani et al. [29]. The mean of the distribution is
reduced from 2.4 to 1.6, for oseltamivir, and to 2.1 for zanami-
vir, but there is a large variance in the possible outcomes; this
helps to explain the large variation in estimates of R* in theliterature [29,33]. Finally, with our mean parameter estimates,
we calculated that, on average, 34 per cent of transmission
occurs within households, as opposed to externally; this is
again in line with previous estimates [16].5. Discussion
We have presented a general modelling framework for
studying household-based interventions to combat infec-
tious diseases. This framework was used to study the use
of antivirals for prophylaxis during the early stages of an
influenza pandemic. In particular, we focused on antiviral
effectiveness during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and the
epidemiological consequences of delays to antiviral delivery.
Our results are relevant to understanding and mitigating
pandemics in three key ways. First, it was found that the anti-
viral efficacies required to stop the invasion of pandemic
influenza given expected delays due to notification and
subsequent delivery are higher than current estimates. How-
ever, antivirals with efficacies as currently estimated [5,6],
and with delays which are realistic under a well-planned
pandemic response plan [34–36], could have a significant
impact on reducing the doubling time in the early stages of
the outbreak.
Secondly, our work contributes to the debate on the
actual efficacy of antivirals. Ghani et al. [29] estimate that
the use of the antiviral oseltamivir reduced transmission by
16 per cent at the population level, which is smaller than



























Figure 6. Pandemic model results for the constant delay model. (a,b) Kernel density plots for the household reproductive ratio, R*, as a function of the mean delay
to allocation for the two types of antivirals oseltamivir and zanamivir. Solid and dashed white curves in (a) and (b) mark the mean and the 95% credible intervals of
these distributions, respectively. (c,d ) The doubling time, Td, as a function of the mean delay for oseltamivir and zanamivir, respectively. Black lines show the mean,
and dashed red and blue lines show the 50% and 95% credible intervals, respectively.

































Figure 7. Additional public-health considerations. (a) Trade-offs giving a percentage reduction in the household reproductive number R*. Here we show the per-
centage reduction in R* for different combinations of antiviral efficacy and mean delay. We assume the exponentially distributed delay model and pandemic
influenza mean parameters, r ¼ t (blue line, t ¼ 0.5; green line, t ¼ 0.65; red line, t ¼ 0.8; light blue line, t ¼ 0.95. (b) Posterior estimates for R*
with a delay distribution (c) taken from [29]. Kernel density plots are shown for R* assuming no interventions (black curve) and a distribution for the mean





8overall reduction in transmission). One possible explanation
for this discrepancy is that the antivirals are less effective
than suggested by controlled trials [25,37], for example, as a
consequence of patients not following the correct guidance;
a 13 per cent reduction is approximately that estimated for
the less efficacious zanamivir. Another explanation is that a
more nuanced model is required which takes into accountthat the effectiveness of the antivirals is a function of the
time since initial infection [38].
Thirdly, an extremely robust conclusion of our work is
that the main damage due to delayed treatment occurs in
the first day or two. This has implications for the trade-offs
that must be made in antiviral distribution policy: obtaining





9with targeting of risk groups (such as larger households),
may be more efficient than late treatment of a larger
number of households. Intuitively, a lengthy delay is likely
to mean that the complete household outbreak has run its
course before antivirals take effect, mitigating any effect
they would have. Note that we would expect this conclusion
to be strengthened still further if the reduced biological effec-
tiveness of delayed antivirals were also modelled explicitly,
as discussed earlier.
We now turn to methodological conclusions from our
work. Here, we have used exponential delays, and also con-
stant delays, to notification and antiviral delivery, which
should provide two reasonably extreme cases. This distri-
bution can be replaced with any phase-type distribution, at
the expense of an increase in the computational running
time of our algorithms; our code is very efficient, and hence
there is scope for significant generalization here, and in par-
ticular Erlang-2 distributions, for example, could be easily
accommodated. Also, as stated earlier, other interventions
could be considered, and other epidemiological responses
to interventions could also be accommodated. For example,
antivirals could also induce an increased recovery rate and
their effectiveness could be made to depend on the stage of
infection. But, in the absence of detailed information, we
have attempted to keep assumptions to a minimum.Another generalization which could be accommodated
within our formulation is different rates of mixing between
households of different sizes. Data that would allow for para-
metrization of such a model are now being collected through
large-scale contact surveys [39]. Such a feature in our model is
likely to have an impact on the effectiveness of interventions,
and may perhaps lead to the identification of optimal tar-
geted intervention strategies. It would also assist in the
study of social-distancing interventions, which will influence
mixing within and between households in different ways
depending, largely, on the household size.
As a final methodological point, we believe the approach
adopted for this study of drawing a large number of par-
ameter sets from posterior distributions, and evaluating
characteristics for each of these parameter sets, is currently
best practise. This allows for kernel density estimates of the
full uncertainty in the epidemiological characteristics and is
made possible by the computational efficiency of our model-
ling framework. We hope this approach is adopted more
widely in infectious disease modelling studies.
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